Sarko in South Africa and Army Ads

Light blogging over the weekend, but next week there should be stuff on missile defense and perhaps other things as I will be going to DC. So just two small links. First, while looking up details on conscription and its alternatives this oldish ComingAnarchy post popped up - with British, Russian and Ukrainian "join the army" ads. Not very subtle stuff, especially the Ukrainian.

Second, France's president Sarkozy elaborated in a speech in SA on his proposed change in France's African policy. France no longer wants to "be the gendarme of Africa". Notable is the introduction of a principle of transparency in French relations with African countries, which apparently also means a hitherto unknown democratization of France's foreign policy with regard to Africa (in bold):

Et je veux devant le Parlement d’Afrique du Sud faire quatre propositions. La première porte sur les accords de défense entre la France et les pays africains. Ils doivent refléter l’Afrique d’aujourd’hui, et non pas l’Afrique d’hier. Ils doivent reposer sur les intérêts stratégiques de la France et de ses partenaires africains. Je ne dis pas qu’il faille nécessairement faire tablerase et tout effacer d’un seul trait de plume. Mais je dis que la France souhaite engager des discussions avec tous les Etats africains concernés pour adapter les accords existants aux réalités du temps présent et en tenant le plus grand compte de la propre volonté des pays africains. La France sera ouverte au dialogue avec tous ceux qui souhaiteront nouer avec elle un nouveau partenariat en matière de sécurité.
Deuxième proposition, je vais refonder nos relations sur un principe qui n’existait pas et que j’imposerai, le principe de la transparence. La transparence, c’est la meilleure garantie pour des relations solides et durables, le meilleur antidote aux fantasmes et aux incompréhensions. Contrairement à la pratique passée, j’annonce au Parlement d’Afrique du Sud que tous les accords de défense entre la France et les pays africains seront intégralement publiés. J’associerai également étroitement le Parlement français aux grandes orientations de la politique de la France en Afrique.
Troisièmement, je propose que la présence militaire française en Afrique serve en priorité à aider l’Afrique à bâtir, comme elle en a l’ambition, son propre dispositif de sécurité collective. L’Union africaine souhaite disposer de forces en attente à l’horizon 2010 – 2012 ? Eh bien que cet objectif soit aussi celui de la France ! La France n’a pas vocation à maintenir indéfiniment des forces armées en Afrique, l’Afrique doit prendre en charge ses problèmes de sécurité. Que l’on me comprenne bien : il ne s’agit nullement d’un désengagement de la France en Afrique. C’est tout le contraire. Je souhaite que la France s’engage davantage au côté de l’Union Africaine, cher Thabo, pour construire le système de sécurité collective dont l’Afrique a besoin car la sécurité de l’Afrique c’est d’abord naturellement l’affaire des Africains.
Enfin, ma dernière proposition vise à faire de l’Europe un partenaire majeur de l’Afrique en matière de paix et de sécurité. C’est le sens du partenariat conclu entre nos deux continents à Lisbonne en décembre dernier. C’est notre intérêt à tous, car une Europe forte a besoin d’une Afrique forte. Mais je sais bien que le meilleur garant de la paix et de la sécurité, c’est la démocratie et la justice. Alors parlons-en de démocratie et de justice. La France souhaite en en Côte d’Ivoire la tenue d’élections libres, justes et reconnues. Aucun pays ne peut espérer le développement sans organiser des élections démocratiques.

State Department Memo on Iraq

Last post today. Just had to recommend Barnett's latest on State Dept and SSTR:

I've been hearing a lot about this memo from various political appointees and senior bureaucrats recently, with everyone saying it would be a big deal when it hit the Net. Well, now it's here and while it is truly damning, to me it's just another nail in the coffin of the idea, promoted by the HELP Commission, that somehow a better or bigger State can handle this sort of operation in the future. Nothing could be further from the truth and this memo speaks to that reality. (...)

The problem is, of course, that our State Department and U.S. foreign policy in general (meaning Bush and Cheney) are largely missing from the scene. Yes, lotsa trips and many talking points delivered, and certainly there's been a vast shuffling of paper in the Green Zone, but where is the diplomacy? The security space created by the Surge was designed to create a political space that remains unexploited and even largely unaddressed. Nowhere is this lack of effort more apparent than in the diplomatic trenches of our State Department presence on the ground in Iraq, which this memo addresses.

Iraq and Afghanistan are transforming our military, with that transformation starting to penetrate the Pentagon itself. But no such transformation is brewing within the State Department, either on the ground or in Foggy Bottom. In the end, I don't expect one to ever brew inside State and, truth be told, I'm not sure one should brew, because I don't see the logic of trying to get this institution to add on such capacity in what will inevitably be a "lesser included" manner. It didn't work at Defense and it won't work at State, even as each department is a key player in this process.

We either create a legitimate bureaucratic center of gravity for such efforts, or we'll continue to underperform.

This seems to be a widespread problem in all of the Western foreign offices. But the diplomats are not the ones who are operative, traditionally. That role befalls the state aid agencies (USAID etc): But does the DFIDs, DANIDAs and NORADs of the world accept that they are in war with the Taliban in Afghanistan?

Regarding Iraq in particular, the memo comes at the same time as Global Guerilla's reflections on the Rosen article in Rolling Stone. Discomforting. For a 100 years?

New Army Field Manual - Implementing Iraq

New Army Field Manual out: This time including SSTR. No time to look at it in detail now, defensetech has the preview here:

...the manual has finally taken the step of elevating stabilization operations to the level of offensive and defensive ops. (...) Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; describing the Army's operational concept -- full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. Mission command is the preferred method of exercising battle command.

Basically, this is the practical implementation of the DoD Directive 3000.05 - and the result of necessities on the ground forcing top Army brass to accept the comprehensive or political COINesque approach to armed conflict championed by Petraeus and smart people at JFCOM.

Get the manual here at the Army site (direct link to pdf, 7,3 megs)

Speaking of JFCOM: Apparantly, a draft version of the Shaping JOC should be close to greenlighting mid March.

China Getting Involved in Darfur?

One major fault line in global politics is the Chinese foreign policy dictum of non-interference vs. the West-sponsored human rights/enlightenment line which is for e.g. humanitarian interventions or at least believes in the right to humanitarian assistance, i.e. in moral imperatives. (More on China's foreign policy doctrine in this old post and more on China in Darfur in this post).

China might now be moving on Darfur - perhaps a sign that Spielberg's personal foreign policy is working?

China's envoy to Darfur has urged Sudan to accept the full deployment of a UN-African Union peacekeeping force. In a rare public rebuke to Khartoum, visiting envoy Liu Guijin said it should "co-operate better with the international community" on the force, according to a report by Chinese official news agency Xinhua. The force began deploying in January, but still lacks most of the 26,000 personnel planned for the mission - due in part to Sudanese objections concerning the international composition of the force. (...)

In his comments to Xinhua, Mr Liu said deploying the peacekeeping operation and resolving the Darfur issue required "the joint efforts of all sides. "First, the Sudan government should co-operate better with the international community and demonstrate greater flexibility on some technical issues. Next, anti-government organisations in the Darfur region should return to the negotiating table."

China has long had strong trade and military links with Khartoum, which is accused of backing militias that have raped and murdered civilians in Darfur - accusations it denies. But Beijing is keen to show it is playing a positive role in the region, says the BBC's Amber Henshaw in Khartoum. Mr Liu said Sudan only bought 8% of its weapons from China and said if China stopped selling weapons, they could easily be purchased from other countries.

Here, from the BBC.

Replacing the F16 - Norwegian Television

For Scandinavian speakers, Norwegian National Television (NRK) broadcast an interesting documentary yesterday. It is a real behind-the-scenes-look at the as of yet not finished decision process about whether to replace the F16s in Norway (a parallel process goes on in Denmark and Holland).

Eurofighter left the three-way competition just before christmas, apparently convinced that they were not getting a fair deal (or that they did not have a competitive product). This leaves the JSF and the Gripen in the running for the largest defence aquisitions ever in Danish and Norwegian history.

About the program
See the program

AFRICOM again

True to form we not only repeat the TicTacs but also the referrals to MountainRunner who's got the latest inside info on the new African Command. E.g.:

I attended USC's AFRICOM conference earlier this month and between panel discussions and offline conversations, I came away with a new appreciation (and hope) for the newest, and very different, command.

This is not like the other Combatant Commands (one DOD representative said they dropped "Combatant" from the title, but depending on where you look, all commands have that word or none of the commands include that adjective).

Also unlike other commands, this is "focused on prevention and not containment or fighting wars." This is, as one speaker continued, is a "risk-laden experiment" that is like an Ironman with multidisciplinary requirements and always different demands [...]. The goal, he continued, was to "keep combat troops off the continent for 50 years" because the consensus was, once troops landed on Africa, it would be extremely difficult to take them off.

Dracobs has been covering Africom of course from the early start - so check out the earlier posts, including those that project the Shaping JOC to be of central relevance for Africom. Shaping aims to do conflict prevention in the shape of grievance settlement, meaning that Pentagon has to do real political development policy.

TicTacs #8: Como decimos ayer

Fittingly, somehow, we return to fore with another round of TicTacs. Not so much because these are tiny sweet bits of info, but because that's where we left off.

• McCain elaborates on the 100-year remark on Iraq. You have to admire his frankness - even though I'd think the base issue has not been bilateraly resolved.
• Danish aerospace expert Karsten Marrup reads into the shooting down of the satellite over the Pacific a wish to demonstrate that the missile defense does actually work. Danish centre-left daily Politiken.
• The air tanker deal is nearing an end according to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Same story from AFP. Last time around Darleen Druyun got a bit too personally involved in the process, but thanks to people including McCain the scandal broke. According to the Economist the Airbus KC30 is the more capable aircraft - but common sense dictates the American domestic choice.
• A host of new CRS reports from FAS Secrecy News by the indomitable Stephen Aftergood, including "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007," updated January 14, 2008 - oh, and the cost of the GWOT.

Tic Tacs #7

Just a quick round up of a couple of central things going on:

• Exit Strategies.Would Iran Take Over Iraq? Would Al-Qaeda? The Debate About How and When to Leave Centers on What Might Happen After the U.S. Goes.

• Two GOP Senators Defy Bush On Iraq. Warner, Lugar Propose Troop Redeployment

• U.S. Official Defends Pakistan's Efforts Against Al-Qaeda

• Barnett on AFRICOM: The Americans Have Landed
  

• The New NIE (pdf file)
  

Civilian SSTR Planning: NSC or Private Sector Lead

There's a huge need for a civilian planning capacity related to SSTR and post-conflict situations (I have written about this before). This need may be the single most important element in the organizational transformation need to prepare ourselves for the next time around.

This blog often takes an American perspective - or looks primarily at American developments. This is because US leadership is paramount. Whatever happens elsewhere is likely to be to small to be consequential or effective. But this doesn't mean that other countries - notably the UK or e.g. Denmark - could not in theory either develop interesting concepts or organizational innovations which might either be of use or inspiration to the US institutions (as in e.g. the PCRU).

Establishing better integrated military-civilian planning is the only way to construct a strategically realistic "total cost of life" approach to future interventions. Such an approach should make clear e.g. the need for civilian (local or external) police forces. Of course, the Dobbins Handbook gives hints but we need more concrete planning.

Evidently, the Pentagon is not going to open their warplanning to civilians - not even the NSC. But it would be helpful if the civilian side could at least know that the Pentagon planning process had or will be reformed in accordance with the DoD Directive 3000.05 (the problem is here that the NSPD 44 formally gives State the lead, and the S/CRS does not have resources even remotely comparable to OSD, Pentagon itself or even JFCOM.

Of course, some of this planning stuff could be produced or at least introduced in generic form by the private and international public sector - here preferably the non-profit side - like e.g. a combination of UN people (from the UNDP plus the Peace-building Commission) and relevant think-tankers like the Dobbins people, and maybe concerted or hosted by the ICG. But in purely US terms, the NSC could play such a role.

The NSC seems to be the only place where funds can be found for this kind of exercise (given substantive executive interest, i.e. will not happen until the next administration). But this means that now would be a good time to spread such and idea in order for it to be somewhere on the upcoming administrations' agendas. Richard Clarke's great "Against All Enemies" explains and exemplifies how an adept operator can help create leeway for interagency policy development inside the NSC. In fact, as he mentions explicitly, he was part of the process for creating POL-MIL plans starting with Haiti. So the nuts and bolts and precedence are there. As always it is more a matter of political will and focus than anything else.

Scandinavia: Weber Incarnate (Plus Bacon)

Oh, and this week's bonus - the most precise and succinct analysis of that region of applied Max Weber: Scandinavia.
Cartoon courtesy of wulffmorgenthaler.com.

Suskind's One Percent Doctrine

Just to stick to the bad conscience theme: Reading is always sweeter when the book you're flipping through as night falls is not the one you ought to read. Actually, in this case we're talking double bad conscience as The One Percent Doctrine by Ron Suskind was a book that was on my list when it came out.

This is not a review, just a recommendation (hereby given) - plus a few general observations:

• Suskind writes well, very well even. Once in a while even too well when his asides on the general character of modern politics become to fluffy, even if they're generally illuminating.
• The book underscores the most important lesson one can learn about politics: It is about ideas that are put to work. Not everyone can do grand strategy, but every (political) organization should prize and protect the people they have that will question the assumptions - doxa in Bourdieu's sense - that we take for granted.
• Explicitness and formalization of the policy process are paramount. It doesn't have to be difficult: hear out the stakeholders and experts, then make a choice. Cherry picking reality is ... evidently idiotic.
• Even if the GWOT (or the Long war) may be in bad standing in European press and public, nobody can or should close their eyes to the basic challenge that Cheney tries/tried to solve with the one percent doctrine. We cannot allow a nuke to go off in our cities - or elsewhere for that matter. As Blair so emphatically stated in his farewell op/ed in the Economist it is not going to go away - we have to fight this struggle.

GAO Report Confirms Civil Planning Need

New GAO report out on US Stability Operations capability and reform (link here is to pdf). From the exec summary:

DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD’s ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15–20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD’s policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD’s guidance.

DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD’s planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range of planning activities.

Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this information because (1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.

The report then confirms what I have said before (in "The Most Unsexy Headline Ever: Planning Capabilities in the Inter-Agency Process"): We need civil planning - or at least: planning for the civilian side of contingency plans. And nobody - including internationally - has the knowhow and the resources to do it but Pentagon.

My Bad Conscience: International Security's Most Downloaded Articles

The net serves great purposes ... like making life more efficient. That too, for bad conscience. See e.g. this list over the most downloaded articles from the International Security site:

This list is updated each day based on the volume of full text downloads.

Track Citation for selected articles

1.

Why Terrorism Does Not Work (2882 times) Max Abrahms International Security Fall 2006, Vol. 31, No. 2: 42-78. Abstract | PDF (205 KB) | PDF Plus (219 KB) | Add to Favorites

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2.

Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities (2674 times) Whitney Raas, Austin Long International Security Spring 2007, Vol. 31, No. 4: 7-33. Abstract | PDF (122 KB) | PDF Plus (124 KB) | Add to Favorites

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3.

The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Confict Inevitable? (2552 times) Aaron L. Friedberg International Security Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2: 7-45. Abstract | PDF (191 KB) | PDF Plus (205 KB) | Add to Favorites

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4.

The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment (2180 times) Christopher Layne International Security Fall 2006, Vol. 31, No. 2: 7-41. Abstract | PDF (150 KB) | PDF Plus (161 KB) | Add to Favorites

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5.

How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups (1987 times) Audrey Kurth Cronin International Security Summer 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1: 7-48. Abstract | PDF (175 KB) | PDF Plus (185 KB) | Add to Favorites

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6.

The Strategies of Terrorism (1984 times) Andrew H. Kydd, Barbara F. Walter International Security Summer 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1: 49-80. Abstract | PDF (154 KB) | PDF Plus (165 KB) | Add to Favorites

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7.

The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy (1458 times) Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press International Security Spring 2006, Vol. 30, No. 4: 7-44. Abstract | PDF (240 KB) | PDF Plus (245 KB) | Add to Favorites

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8.

Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy (1279 times) Bruce W. Jentleson, Christopher A. Whytock International Security Winter 2005/06, Vol. 30, No. 3: 47-86. Abstract | PDF (164 KB) | PDF Plus (171 KB) | Add to Favorites

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9.

Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes (1223 times) M. Taylor Fravel International Security Fall 2005, Vol. 30, No. 2: 46-83. Abstract | PDF (169 KB) | PDF Plus (178 KB) | Add to Favorites

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10.

Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War (1070 times) Michael Barnett International Security Spring 2006, Vol. 30, No. 4: 87-112. Abstract | PDF (118 KB) | PDF Plus (127 KB) | Add to Favorites

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11.

Warlordism in Comparative Perspective (953 times) Kimberly Marten International Security Winter 2006/07, Vol. 31, No. 3: 41-73. Abstract | PDF (137 KB) | PDF Plus (141 KB) | Add to Favorites

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12.

Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War (830 times) Monica Duffy Toft International Security Spring 2007, Vol. 31, No. 4: 97-131. Abstract | PDF (198 KB) | PDF Plus (203 KB) | Add to Favorites

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13.

Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia (717 times) Thomas J. Christensen International Security Summer 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1: 81-126. Abstract | PDF (184 KB) | PDF Plus (194 KB) | Add to Favorites

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14.

Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq (544 times) Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, Jason Reifler International Security Winter 2005/06, Vol. 30, No. 3: 7-46. Abstract | PDF (256 KB) | PDF Plus (261 KB) | Add to Favorites

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15.

Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping (542 times) Ken Menkhaus International Security Winter 2006/07, Vol. 31, No. 3: 74-106. Abstract | PDF (341 KB) | PDF Plus (162 KB) | Add to Favorites

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16.

Soft Balancing against the United States (529 times) Robert A. Pape International Security Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1: 7-45. Abstract | PDF (185 KB) | PDF Plus (196 KB) | Add to Favorites

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17.

Is China a Status Quo Power? (503 times) Alastair Iain Johnston International Security Spring 2003, Vol. 27, No. 4: 5-56. Citation | PDF (271 KB) | PDF Plus (279 KB) | Add to Favorites

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18.

China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order (447 times) David Shambaugh International Security Winter 2004/05, Vol. 29, No. 3: 64-99. Citation | PDF (164 KB) | PDF Plus (170 KB) | Add to Favorites

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19.

Structural Realism after the Cold War (415 times) Kenneth N. Waltz International Security Summer 2000, Vol. 25, No. 1: 5-41. Citation | PDF (257 KB) | PDF Plus (264 KB) | Add to Favorites

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20.

Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? (412 times) Roland Paris International Security Fall 2001, Vol. 26, No. 2: 87-102. Citation | PDF (135 KB) | PDF Plus (139 KB) | Add to Favorites

Not only do you discover things you didn't read. You also see that things you saw in the TOC and thought "nah, doesn't matter, no time" and now its here, being downloaded and the market always tells the truth, eh, so maybe you should read it anyway?

Either that, or the list is just an expression of what's free and what's not. All of the Top 12 articles are free: the first paying article is Thomas J. Christensen's "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia", who then wins the contest for being most attractive in spite of the cost.

The great thing about the list is the daily update. Now, you kinda see in the spirit how several of the authors will click in every day to follow their stock in the trade, nervously tracking their fortunes on the waves of academia.

That of course leaves open all kinds of ridiculous possibilities, like repeats of the record promoting business where promotors would buy endless stacks of records to get their singles high enough on the charts to get them airtime and make that generate some real sales... Will a Professor be tempted to pull several thousand downloads through his students? Can you make money with a company that will enable academics to buy enhanced visibility through automated and timed downloads?

Bensahel/Survival: Useful Nationbuilding Reform Overview

Whether, how and how far to reform for nationbuilding operations has become the central strategic question in the OECD/NATO camp. We all now we have to contribute to and take the lead in administrating the state system, but how and especially how far do we want to go? Will preparing well mean creating an offer that begets a demand? Will it weaken our resolve in terms of "real war"? Or has modern war been finally rendered clausewitzian -- to be always about political endstates, and does this mean we have to take an institutional leap? The new issue of Survival contains an overview over recent bureaucratic efforts in the US, UK, Canada, Germany, EU and G8 -- prepared by Nora Bensahel from the RAND Corp.

Recent years have seen numerous initiatives to build organisational capacity for nation-building operations in both national govern­ments and international organisations. These initiatives have made some progress, but they share a number of common problems, including bureaucratic turf wars, interagency and intergovernmental coordination challenges, limited financial resources, and shortages of qualified personnel. If left unchecked, these problems may prevent these initiatives from addressing the capacity challenges they were designed to solve.

Failed State Index 07: Convergence Between Security and Development

Failed states are perhaps the best illustration of the convergence between security and development policy. Foreign Policy magazine (in cooperation with the Fund for Peace) has now published its 2007 edition.

Go check it out.

Tic Tacs #6

Miami Herald: "Iran aid to Taliban hints at policy shift. U.S. officials suspect that Iranian weapons shipments to the Taliban may be retaliation for U.S. foreign policy."

Secrecy News: National Intelligence Council Sponsors Wiki on Global Disease. Students at Mercyhurst College created a wiki-based resource on global disease to support the National Intelligence Council, while demonstrating the utility of the wiki approach for intelligence analysis. "The fundamental question had to do with the impact of chronic and infectious diseases on US national interests over the next 10-15 years," said Prof. Kristan J. Wheaton, whose class produced the wiki.

Counterterrorism Blog: "A few days ago, I spoke with a U.S. official working for one of the new embedded provisional reconstruction teams (EPRTs) in Iraq. (...) The EPRTs are different. Rather than operating separately from and parallel to the military, they are embedded within the military structure. Six EPRTs operate in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in Babil. Their structure is similar to that of the PRTs (run by a foreign service officer, featuring a U.S. Army deputy, a USAID member, a bicultural advisor, and other staffers) but rather than functioning in the top-down manner of the PRTs, the EPRTs are designed to make more of a difference at what the official called the "granular" level. That is, the EPRTs are integrated into the military's tactical operations, and are designed to advance reconstruction efforts on a street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood basis.

Thomas P.M. Barnett: "The talks are cordial, but go nowhere. ARTICLE: "U.S. and Iranian Officials Meet in Baghdad, but Talks Yield No Breakthroughs," by Kirk Semple, New York Times, 29 May 2007, p. A8. Why should they? We hold talks to see what Iran can do to save our asses in Iraq but refuse to use that venue to discuss any quid pro quo Tehran might desire. These talks aren't designed to work. They're designed to check a box. That's my weekend column. "

The Politics of Assessing and Strategizing Iraq

Go Big, Go Home, Go Long. Thus were the options scrutinized in JCS Pace's study back in November last year. The first was the logical military solution, the second the somewhat (now: really) pressing political solution, and the third, a little unclearly, represented something between a smart version of the first (through the lens of the COIN manual) and a compromise between the two first - each expressing the needs on the ground in Iraq and the needs on the ground in the domestic US situation.

Back last year I wrote:

The Long War is marked by its accelleration of the politicization of the use of force: the fronts are simultaneously on the ground and at home. Operations happen within two realms: effects are created almost at the same time in the immediate/practical and in the symbolical/communicative realms.

Modern war, it seems, better get it right fast enough that the domestic situation doesn't catch up with it, and start redefining. Not unjust that - merely a democratic precondition for the use of force.

From NYT: Some Hitherto Staunch G.O.P. Voters Souring on Iraq
From The AP (via the Age, Australia): Military leaders doubtful about success in Iraq
From WashTimes (Harlan Ullman): Assessing the Iraq surge
From the LAT: Iraq likely to miss goals set by U.S.

Will Europeans Block Ghani Candidature for WB Prez?

According to the WashPost the World "Bank May Vote No Confidence in Wolfowitz". One piece of information suggest that diplomatic scheming might be bad news for Ashraf Ghani who's been mentioned as the Bush administration's top of the list candidate to replace Wolfowitz in case this would become necessary:

Though prominent officials from Europe to Latin America have publicly called for Wolfowitz to go, and though the board has the power to fire him, a decisive vote would break sharply with the bank's consensus-minded culture, while presenting nettlesome questions of procedure and diplomacy. Never in the six decades of the World Bank's existence has the board removed the institution's leader, who, by tradition, is selected by the U.S. president.

In pursuing an expression of no confidence in place of a decisive vote, board members were working under instructions from the governments they represent, with major European countries intent on avoiding a fresh imbroglio with the Bush administration, senior officials said. European governments fear they could lose their right to name the head of the World Bank's sister institution, the International Monetary Fund.

The thing is: If Bush appoints Ghani, who's Afghan - and effectively ends the tradition that an American gets the top WB job - then the Europeans will be less able to defend getting to name the head of the IMF. Might that cause the Europeans to support or push for a US citizen?

Tic Tacs #5

Tom Barnett on John Robb's book Brave New Wars: "John's book is deeply informed by the fact he's a serious technocrat who distrusts politics. Indeed, politics as any form of solution is basically missing in action in this book. When it's referred to glancingly here and there, it's always to catalogue dysfunction or corruption (e.g., America's entire political system is dismissed with a reference to Jack Abramoff's ability to purchase it at will--a blanketing statement which comes off as strangely naive in its cynicism, but that's not unusual for military guys who often describe Washington like it's some modern-day Sodom)."

From the AP via Yahoo: "The Pentagon is setting up a civilian Language Corps, a cadre of some 1,000 foreign-language speakers who can help the government in times of war and national emergencies. In a three-year pilot program, the Defense Department will recruit volunteers and do testing to see if such a program would work. If successful, a permanent corps could be developed, said Robert Slater, who heads the Pentagon personnel office's security education program. "The federal government can't possibly identify, hire and warehouse professionals with skills in 150 languages," Slater said Wednesday. "So it's invaluable to be able to respond in emergencies, whether international or national.""

World Bank Private Sector Development Blog on quality of FDI (quote from referenced paper): "This paper exploits a comprehensive, industry level data set for the period 1985-2000 that encompasses 29 countries to examine the various links between different “types” of FDI and growth. An appealing feature of industry analysis is that it mitigates some of the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and model misspecification, which are difficult to control at the national level. We also use as an instrument a new industry-level data set on industry targeting. We find FDI at the industry level to be associated with higher growth in value added. The relation is stronger for industries with higher skill requirements and for industries more reliant on external capital."

North County Times: "CAMP PENDLETON -- The first five of 24 Iraqi civilians killed in Haditha by a squad of Camp Pendleton Marines in 2005 were repeatedly shot by two sergeants who then agreed to blame the slayings on the Iraqi army, one of the shooters testified Wednesday afternoon. Sgt. Sanick Dela Cruz said he fired at the five men moments after Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich unleashed a barrage of bullets at the group being held at gunpoint with their arms raised in the air."

WorldPublicOpinion.org: "Publics around the world say the United Nations has the responsibility to protect people from genocide and other severe human rights abuses even if this means acting against the will of their own government, according to a multinational study."

Darfur: Proxy War Over Good Governance Unfolding

If the controversial report about Chinese and Russian arms shipments to Sudan in breach of a UN embargo are true, then this post about the rising Chinese influence in Africa seems properly wrought, including the pointy title part about "Proxy Wars Over Good Governance". From the AP via the cutely named Seattle Post Intelligencer:

A top human rights group accused China and Russia on Tuesday of violating a U.N. arms embargo by supplying Sudan with weapons and equipment that were used to fuel deadly violence against civilians in Darfur and neighboring Chad. (...) The report said "the bulk" of the arms used in Darfur and Chad were transferred from China and Russia, with Sudan importing $83 million in arms from Beijing and $34.7 million in military equipment from Moscow in 2005, the latest available figures. It did not provide specific up-to-date figures. "The irresponsible transfer of arms to Sudan and its neighbors are a significant factor in the massive human rights catastrophe in Darfur and its spread into eastern Chad," London-based Amnesty said in a statement. (...)

Amnesty said it was particularly concerned about Russian Mi-24 helicopter gunships acquired by the Sudan air force that were allegedly being used to launch attacks in Darfur. The report included a photo, allegedly from March, of three Chinese "Fantan" fighter jets on the tarmac of an airport in Nyala in southern Darfur. It said the aircraft were "specifically designed to be used for ground attack operations." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said Beijing does not sell arms to regions under a U.N. embargo. She said China's weapons sales to Africa were made to sovereign nations and were "very limited and small in scale" but refused to say specifically how much was sold to Sudan. (...)

The Amnesty report followed the leaking of a U.N. report last month asserting that Sudan's government was flying attack aircraft, painted white to resemble U.N. planes, and other military equipment into Darfur against the embargo. Sudan denied the claims. Following that report, the U.S. and Britain began leading a push for new sanctions against Sudan if it continues to refuse to deploy U.N. peacekeepers in Darfur. An ill-equipped and understaffed African Union force is patrolling the western Sudan region. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has refused calls for a joint U.N.-AU force, although he recently agreed to let the U.N. send 3,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, backed by six helicopter gunships.

Both Russia and China, which have close trade ties with Sudan, oppose the U.S.-British sanctions proposal. China - which buys two-thirds of Sudan's oil exports - is facing increasing international pressure to use its influence in Sudan to pressure Khartoum into stopping the violence. "Nobody has the leverage that the Chinese do - not the Arab League, not the U.S., not the EU. It's the Chinese; they're the ones," said Eric Reeves, a Sudan expert at Smith College in Massachusetts.

From the post from April 2006:

China's recent African Policy document outlines an extensive interest in engaging in African development. The most notable difference from Western development policies is the absence of good governance as a leitmotiv -- and its logical counterpart, the adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". The Principles support non-interference: as such they are at odds with the essence of Western development policy which posits that there can be universally applicable most-effective ways of undertaking government, i.e. "good governance". (...) [T]he most crucial countries are the natural ressource rich kleptocracies that from the outset will be least inclined to ever participate in good governance initiatives. Here, the intention of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative already suffers from combination of the Chinese need for oil and the willfully blind perspective of the Five Principles. In short, the good governance agenda looks set to really suffer from China's African engagement. And unfortunately, that effect will be the same elsewhere too.

If the Chinese (and Russians) are really flushing weapons - including gunships and A10-like fixed-wing aircraft - into Sudan in spite of the UN embargo, this is a clear example of a proxy war in spe. Even if the responsible partners in global security management (UN, NATO) are struggling to find the ressources necessary to help stop the conflict, there is no doubt - viz. the embargo - that these same actors agree about the basic goals and values that the challenge represents. How ironic that I meant the 'proxy wars' over good governance to be taken mostly metaphorically. China must step up to the plate of responsibility here - but as written in the post quoted, this is unlike to to happen as long as there is something as the five principles (and a craving for ressources).

Shaping: Clever Slide and New Name

Just a few notes on the coming Shaping JOC. There is a remarkably clever graphic in the 2005 JFCOM capstone document which clearly deserves wider attention. It shows the move from a sequential conception of conflict management (like wagons on a train) to a parallel conceptualization; and also a move from a purely military to an integrated, political conceptualization of the conflict phases. Note e.g. the role of Stabilization and Reconstruction in violet and orange. I can only blame myself for not flipping through the appendixes earlier, but here goes:

Phases, however, tend to imply a sequential approach to campaigns with an associated lack of flexibility and inadequately reflect the importance of integrated effort among all interagency players. The CCJO acknowledges that “complex adaptive” adversaries and other situations will demand an integrated and flexible approach. A new campaign framework should provide a means to plan, execute and assess campaigns in an integrated manner. This appendix retains the traditional phase titles and includes proposed new phase titles--portrayed as lines of effort (Figure D-1).
Instead of showing these lines of effort in a traditional horizontal array, however, it stacks them vertically, emphasizing the potential for all lines of effort to be applicable throughout a campaign. The lines of effort represent the activities in which a JFC must engage to successfully accomplish objectives during a campaign. They are titled Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority. The aggregate of all lines of effort equate to the full level of effort necessary (in planning or execution) or available (in execution or assessment) to accomplish objectives. (...)

The simultaneous execution of activities within each line of effort reinforces the need to continuously consider activities across all lines of effort during campaign planning and execution. This approach also captures the proportionate levels of activity that may be required to achieve priority objectives. In so doing, it helps the JFC visualize the required activities for future transitions and subsequent operations, reflecting increasing or decreasing levels of effort. As the campaign is executed, the JFC acquires knowledge, extends reach and creates effects. Concurrently, the JFC assesses the changing operational environment and varies the amount of effort within each applicable line while focusing on a series of priority objectives that contribute to achieving the strategic objective. The level of effort will vary depending on the type of operation, and the actual events that occur. Figure D-2 depicts a proportional level of effort for a notional campaign where actual events have modified the framework from what was originally planned (Figure D-1).
Lines of effort demonstrate a more sophisticated approach the future joint force could take in planning, executing, and analyzing campaigns. Although all lines of effort are considered concurrently, some lines will be given priority due to their relevance to the specific objectives assigned. Identifying priorities will help the JFC allocate and re-allocate resources between lines of effort. Figures 1 and 2 reflect the likely need for multiple instruments of national power to engage based on the objectives and therefore helps reinforce the need to integrate interagency activities throughout the campaign.

The 'lines of operation' concept necessitates a broader civil-military (or: properly strategic) conceptualization of conflict. It therefore basically synthesizes the basic challenge in modern warfare and conflict management we are faced with. This includes the clausewitzian goals of transitioning to and from civil ownership of the aggregate process, and the implication of COIN approximate wider political, administrative and economic means and ends. These thoughts looks like a path way toward what Antulio J. Echevarria called for - from a way of battle to a way of war in a proper clausewitzian (i.e. political) context.

Another thing is that apparently, it is likely that the JOC will have its name changed as 'shaping' carries a too meddling connotation. The possible change is understandable to the extent that it follows the same logic as the CENTCOM reasoning behind giving up on the Long War concept.

But it is less sensible if the change merely results in newspeak, i.e. if the JOC will not refer to actual "meddling" practices (with the risk of rendering the exercise futile). Of course, we are here in the midst of the whole, very politically laden "post colonial" debate - over sovereignty. Personally, I'm all for calling things what they are - and it seems that some euphemisms in the development policy circuit could be done without. But that is (albeit only slightly) a different matter.

The Most Unsexy Headline Ever: Planning Capabilities in the Inter-Agency Process

The USG inter-agency process* is dependent upon the planning capabilities of the Pentagon - and maybe it shouldn't be. Increasingly, the inter-agency process is the center of gravity for the United States' aggregate security capabilities (for simplifying reasons, let's stick here to the functional phases of conflict as conceptualized within US defense - phases zero to IV. Obviously, not all conflicts contain use of armed force). But only the US Department of Defense has extensive planning and business development sections working on generalized and concrete preparations for pre-conflict and post-conflict issues.

No-one doubts that the US rules phase III - major combat operations. But the US is not amassing the potential power it has for phases zero and IV. The latter refers to postconflict and the former to preconflict. To each of these belong at set of tasks that are more or less well-described and more or less well-understood. Post-conflict is a more well-described in terms of probable solutions and possibly better understood than pre-conflict. This is because post-conflict is more clearly a challenge for concrete organizations - ours, at least to begin with.

Post-conflict refers to both a complex organizational and logistic task (establishing country and government-wide administrative functioning organizations through military and civilian capabilities while/and handing them over to the host nation) and a strategic task namely identifying the wanted host national endstate, in fucntion of feasibility and ambitions (the choice is evidently shaped by political and anthropological both ramifications and limitations). To this effect, JFCOM has created the SSTR JOC which describes in general terms the challenges and is used as basis for doctrine development; Pentagon has issued the DoD Directive 3000.05, which sets SSTR Ops on par with major combat operations (i.e. the military has to be able to brak stuff efficiently and to hand over the pieces to subsequent civilian authority in accordance with the overall, wanted political endstate); and State has been given coordinate authority over phase IV so that the military in principle only has a supportive function - the chief of State's Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is in charge of coordinating this particular element in the inter-agency process (not really sure how it/he formally ties in with the NSC which is in charge of the overall process).

Pre-conflict on the other hand is about identifying and addressing - ultimately managing - emerging conflicts so that they do not evolve into something we cannot live with for humanitarian or security reasons, or both. If we put on the USG glasses then, in principle, this challenge calls for both civilian and security (military and covert) means, because the challenge in itself has a political and anthropological character - it cannot be purely military. Much of the existing framework of international organizations and here especially the UN deals with pre-conflict. Development policy itself is a central piece in this puzzle. Conceiving of development policy as a means in to a pre-conflict management end is controversial but helpful.

Pre-conflict there has not recieved the same institutional attention as post-conflict. Only the JFCOM is developing a new Joint Operating Concept for 'Shaping' operations. The CINC at AFRICOM will be likely to get the responsibility for contingency planning like the other CINCs have. A number of these will be proper war plans. The majority will likely deal with evacuation, humanitarian assistance and especially FID, COIN and counterterrorism - foreign internal defense operations and (support to) counterinsurgency. But the most consequential work, if the AFRICOM commander gets it right, will be based on the conceptual work being done on pre-conflict issues.

There is an institutional trap here: the military traditionally is very strong in war planning. In its self-understanding the military exists to carry out major missions. These are represented in war and contingency plans. But the pre-conflict logic is more civilian, oriented towards day-to-day process of political subjects (but it is at the same time more general, strategic than a war plan case). The challenge for both JFCOM and AFRICOM will be to enhance the pre-conflict stuff to the same institutional importance as those threats that can be addressed through war planning.

The military develops and produces contingency planning and joint concepts at COCOM and JFCOM levels. No such equivalent exists within the civilian apparatus. The US military has some unique institutional strengths in planning and concept development, both in terms of talent and numbers, and in terms of formalization of process. The civilian side could learn a lot from these guys.

But there is an institutional imbalance here. Neither State Department or the NSC have ressources for strategic planning comparable to Pentagon's. Pentagon is 'only' responsible for developing plans and JOCs in support of the overall USG inter-agency process on pre- and post-conflict where the civilian agencies are in the lead. One solution is of course for e.g. the AFRICOM commander to involve or integrate civilian agencies very much up front in strategic planning and forecasting. But even if this is an understandable and pragmatic approach there is something lopsided about a process that will then hinge the institutitional setup of carrying out US foreign policy (State's domain) on the individual character of e.g. the AFRICOM commander. In the end, pre-conflict management can then be boiled down to whether the given commander 'gets' the political and anthropological stuff.

That seems like an unnecessarily contingent element. Maybe State Department or the NSC should get into the conceptual development and planning work on their own account so that they get a better - more strictly institutionalized - chance of getting heard? That might also ensure, that the military winds up with less situations where they are formally in a supportive function while really having to do it all.


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* For the non-US reader: the 'inter-agency process' is the term describing the policy coordination going on inside US Government (USG). The National Security Council is the agency responsible for the process concerning national security matters.