Democratic Aspirations to Leadership in National Security

Just a quick addition to these earlier posts on US Foreign Policy in Search of a Via Media and on The Waning Momentum of Freedom.

The Progressive Policy Institute, affiliated with the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) has recently published a tome of essays entitled With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty, which continues in the vein of the 2003 Asmus report:

Instead of falling back on easy criticisms of the administration's blunders in Iraq, [the] book argues that progressives should seize the moment by proposing a comprehensive agenda for winning the war against jihadist terrorism -- an agenda rooted in the tough-minded, internationalist tradition of Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy.

Contributors include Ronald D. Asmus, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Kevin Pollack, Larry Diamond and Graham Allison: table of contents here. From the chapter summaries:

The book WITH ALL OUR MIGHT proceeds from three premises: First, defeating Islamist extremism is America’s top security imperative. Second, victory demands a new strategy that is both tough and smart. Third, progressives should stop reacting to President Bush and start leading on national security.

Looks interesting: but positive political ramifications are still dependent on whether the Democrats can sort out the messy challenge from the anti-globalization wing. Will these ideas be convincing and catch on in that camp? Will they be read at all at the European centre-left? And why is there so little comparably proactive foreign policy analysis and conjecture coming out of politically connected academic and policy circles in Europe?

The Economist's Revival & Lessons of US Welfare Reform

The Economist has become steadily and markedly better ever since Bill Emmot stepped down as Editor-in-Chief earlier this spring. The difference is really remarkable: the ideas and analyses are sharper and more equitable; the observations and editorial selections are fresher, more provocative, and thus ultimately, productive. Former US editor John Micklethwait who got the top position has really done a superb job so far.

One good example is this week's edition's article on the outcome of the 1990s American welfare reform:

After peaking in 1994—when many states began experimenting ahead of the federal law—America's welfare caseload fell by 60% over the next decade, from 5m to 2m families. Instead, welfare mothers found work, and the biggest increase by far was among those who had never been married. Their employment rate leapt from 44% in 1993 to 66% in 2000 (see chart) and the poverty rate, instead of rising sharply, dropped from 15.1% to 11.3%.
A decade ago, much of the political left believed that such a rapid transition from welfare to work was impossible, and the reforms cruel. Why did they turn out so much better than the doomsayers predicted? A booming economy surely deserves some credit. (...) Wage subsidies also helped a great deal. (...) The 1996 welfare reforms themselves, however, clearly explain much of the success. Jason Turner—a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank—argues that “the political left believed in a hospital model of the poor: caretaking and compassion with low expectations.” America's conservatives expected more. And as it became clear to welfare recipients that the rules had changed, many of them began meeting those expectations.

The results and conclusions will probably surprise or even dismay many Europeans but they should be a source of inspiration (to the degree that they haven't already been, as is the case in e.g. the Danish labor market). On the other hand, the article's fairly daring conclusions call for further improvements:

The good news is that, having largely won the battle against idleness and dependency, America is now in a much better position to attack poverty head on. But it will not succeed by simply ratcheting up the states' work requirements, as Congress did earlier this year. Instead, America must build on the past decade's accomplishments by tackling three important challenges.

The first is to find new ways to help the children of those who are mildly disabled, emotionally disturbed, mentally slow or addicted to drugs or alcohol. With everyone else working, people with these traits comprise a growing share of those who now turn up at welfare offices. That they tend to make lousy workers is not the biggest worry; their limited ability to raise children is far more troubling. (...)

America's second challenge, now that so many former welfare mothers have ended up in low-paying jobs, is to raise the incomes of the working poor. That means giving them skills. (...) America needs to treat welfare reform as a part of workforce development, says Jennifer Noyes, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison's Institute for Research on Poverty. (...) If America really wants to make a lasting dent in poverty, however, its third challenge is to change the odds that young women will end up on welfare. Mr Grogger points out that only half of America's reduction in welfare caseloads stemmed from women leaving the rolls; the other half occurred because fewer women entered the welfare system. The incentives that are now in place should help to keep that entry rate down. But anything that can cajole or entice more young women into staying in school and delaying pregnancy improves their chances of never going on welfare (and, of course, of earning much more than the current generation of working single mums). (...)

To meet these challenges, America will need to rediscover some of the bipartisan pragmatism that prompted Mr Clinton to buck his left-wing critics and sign a controversial Republican law ten years ago. Conservatives now seem too preoccupied with tougher work rules and promoting marriage to think seriously about the next round of anti-poverty reforms. And many on the left are resisting good ideas about school vouchers and job-training with the same sort of scare tactics that they used against welfare reform a decade ago.

More thoughts in tendencies in Western labor markets here: Income Gap Might Shrink: White Collar, OECD Coping Strategies.

LATER UPDATE: See also Mark E. Courtney's column in the Washington Post: "Welfare Reform's Shortcoming", which points in the direction of a more personalized guidance system, incidentally akin to some of the reforms undertaken in Denmark.

A Ghani UNSG Candidature in the Offing?

[LATER UPDATE: See: Ghani Runs for UNSG and Deserves to Win]

The Financial Times now mention Ashraf Ghani among the two, top alternative candidates for taking over at the UN after current UNSG Annan steps down. But more than just getting the FTs attention, Ghani's possible candidature is being vetted from several sides:

"The conventional wisdom is that none of the four candidates stand much of a chance," said one Security Council diplomat. The idea is that once the field has cleared, other candidates will emerge from the wings. One strong potential figure could be Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's former prime minister. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan's respected former finance minister, is also contemplating a bid, having been approached by President Hamid Karzai and sounded out by several European governments, the FT has learnt.

As written before (Next UNSG Must Know Security), it is highly important for the UN that the coming top guy knows both development and security. Furthermore, he needs to be a proactive administrator. Being proactive in terms of bridging differences by bold or imaginative proposals before the differences grow too large is key for the coming UNSG. Ghani himself agrees with this analysis -- see his new piece on nepalnews.com, and especially this argument on the importance of leadership:

In the absence of leadership, the people’s energy is focused on gaining immediate benefits for themselves. Groups, from organised labour in private businesses and schools, to even the civil service are demanding more for themselves, expecting the New Nepal to bring payoffs to them. Political leaders have been unable to counter such demands because they have not articulated the new vision and defined the new compact. The people’s movement was able to bring down the old regime but without leadership of vision and action, it will not be able to construct a New Nepal.

If the leaders fail in this critical moment, the state is bound to fail under the weight of excessive expectations alone. Surely the people of Nepal deserve leadership from their politicians to ensure that Nepal embarks upon a path towards a new future. In this unique moment, even the age-old social barriers to inclusion seem surmountable. A new future is no longer a dream, it has become possible.

However if this chance is wasted, the mobilised energies of the people could not only dissipate but, worse still, feed into a vicious cycle of violence and destruction. Nepal would rapidly fall back into the old orbit defined by the old dynamics. Seizing a rare, historic moment and turning it into the beginning of a new future requires a clear vision and sustained action. A clear vision enables collective efforts by citizens and sustained action reinforces their belief in the attainability of the new future.

Ashraf Ghani -- accomplished academic and practical reformer both -- would surely be a remarkable candidate (Ghani Would Be Good For UN: FT Op-Ed On Reconstruction).


LATER UPDATE: The FT reiterates its information on Ghani after the first "informal strawpoll" on the official candidates:

The poll has been described as only a first indication, as the process has some way to go, and other candidates are expected to emerge from the wings. One strong potential figure could be Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s former prime minister. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan’s respected former finance minister, is also contemplating a bid, having been approached by President Hamid Karzai and sounded out by several European governments, the FT has learnt.

Moreover, a new Webmemo from the Heritage Foundation picks up on Ghani's possible candidature as well, mentioning him first among the other potential candidates:

News reports indicate that, while Ban Ki-Moon and Shashi Tharoor led the UN Security Council’s first straw poll to become the next Secretary-General, there is a “a general sense that none of the candidates were likely to succeed.”

If the official candidates founder, other potential candidates include Afghanistan’s former finance minister Ashraf Ghani; Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan; President Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia; former deputy prime minister and finance minister of Malaysia Anwar Ibrahim; current high commissioner of Pakistan to the United Kingdom and a former ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi; former President of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski; Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong; and Administrator of the UN Development Programme Kemal Dervis of Turkey.

How the U.S. will vote on the official candidates is unclear. Although President Bush’s statements on July 10 indicate that the U.S. has acknowledged demands that the next Secretary-General be from Asia, it also seems clear that the U.S. will oppose candidates whom it considers unsuitable. Thus far, the U.S. appears unenthused about any of the four declared candidates, which may in part reflect its uncertainty about the commitment of the individual candidates to fundamental UN reform. Based on comments by U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, UN reform is a priority for the U.S. and will be a key factor in its decision whether to support or oppose a particular candidate.

US Foreign Policy Doctrine In Search of a Via Media

An fairly thorough op-ed by Robert Wright in the New York Times -- "An American Foreign Policy That Both Realists and Idealists Should Fall in Love With" -- in a summerly way reopens the old discussion of how best to serve US foreign policy in terms of general doctrines: idealism or realism?

Wright's op-ed is thus added to Fukuyama's call for a changed neorealism, a "Realistic Wilsonianism" (see this post for more) ; and to the 2003 Ronald D. Asmus report from the Democrats Progressive Policy Institute "Progressive Internationalism: A Democrat Security Strategy" (2003). Wright proposes his "progressive realism" as a bridgebuilder for Democrats and Republicans alike to embrace -- even if his objective, like Asmus', is to serve the Democrats by helping them to recast their troubled legacy on foreign policy since Vietnam and Carter. Asmus addresses the Democratic legitimacy deficit on security. He wants the Democrats to embrace a more muscular approach compared to the globalization critics on the left; but also to be more humanitarian than the state-centered right:

We begin by reaffirming the Democratic Party's commitment to progressive internationalism -- the belief that America can best defend itself by building a world safe for individual liberty and democracy. We therefore support the bold exercise of American power, not to dominate but to shape alliances and international institutions that share a common commitment to liberal values. The way to keep America safe and strong is not to impose our will on others or pursue a narrow, selfish nationalism that betrays our best values, but to lead the world toward political and economic freedom.

While some complain that the Bush administration has been too radical in recasting America's national security strategy, we believe it has not been ambitious or imaginative enough. We need to do more, and do it smarter and better to protect our people and help shape a safer, freer world. Progressive internationalism occupies the vital center between the neo-imperial right and the non-interventionist left, between a view that assumes that our might always makes us right and one that assumes that because America is strong it must be wrong.

Too many on the left seem incapable of taking America's side in international disputes, reflexively oppose the use of force, and begrudge the resources required to keep our military strong. Viewing multilateralism as an end in itself, they lose sight of goals, such as fighting terrorism or ending gross human rights abuses, which sometimes require us to act -- if need be outside a sometimes ineffectual United Nations. And too many adopt an anti-globalization posture that would not only erode our own prosperity but also consign billions of the world's neediest people to grinding poverty. However troubling the Bush record, the pacifist and protectionist left offers no credible alternative.

Progressive internationalism stresses the responsibilities that come with our enormous power: to use force with restraint but not to hesitate to use it when necessary, to show what the Declaration of Independence called "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind," to exercise leadership primarily through persuasion rather than coercion, to reduce human suffering where we can, and to create alliances and international institutions committed to upholding a decent world order. We must return to four core principles that have long defined the Democratic Party's tradition of tough-minded internationalism: National strength; Liberal democracy; Free enterprise; World leadership (italics added).

Wright on the other hand proposes a bit less aggressive version, more centered on a belief in economic forces and international regulatory regimes, but still attuned to change abroad in what IR people call "second image reversed" dynamics, namely the effects of the international environment on regimes:

Progressive realism begins with a cardinal doctrine of traditional realism: the purpose of American foreign policy is to serve American interests. But these days serving American interests means abandoning another traditional belief of realists — that so long as foreign governments don’t endanger American interests on the geopolitical chess board, their domestic affairs don’t concern us. In an age when Americans are threatened by overseas bioweapons labs and outbreaks of flu, by Chinese pollution that enters lungs in Oregon, by imploding African states that could turn into terrorist havens, by authoritarian Arab governments that push young men toward radicalism, the classic realist indifference to the interiors of nations is untenable. (...)

For now we can be patient and nurture regime change through economic engagement and other forms of peaceful, above-board influence. The result will be more indigenous, more culturally authentic paths to democracy than flow from invasion or American-backed coups d’état — and more conducive to America’s security than, say, the current situation in Iraq. Democrats can join President Bush in proclaiming that “freedom is on the march” without buying his formula for assisting it.

Soul searching on foreign policy doctrines is not only the reserve of Democrats -- even if they are the ones with the most manifest problem in terms of general voter legitimacy and clear divisions among their core voters (as the high-lighted parts of the Asmus quote shows). Furthermore, these divisions are practically the same in the European centre, centre-left and left proper.

Francis Fukuyama's analysis of and call for a "Realistic Wilsonianism" is another attempt at balancing the two trends. He wants to bring neoconservatism closer to realism: less reliance on military means; and return to the original neoconservative criticism of social engineering -- more on Fukuyama here.

As always, when anyone presents you with two extremes, the synthesis of the via media looks logical and viable. And of course it is: neither blindly hardnosed realism nor blue-eyed idealism are satisfying accounts of ideals or practices of foreign policy. Rather, these categories are what the different political wings ascribe to one another -- expressions of ideological polemics. Just as evidently, the devil is in the details: the actual choice is not between the extremes, but in the balance between them.

Moreover, the question is in the end not whether that balancing will happen -- arguably, it happened in practice already in the around new year 2004 when the Bush Administration started courting the Europeans to some extent again (visibly at that years Munich conference); with the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative and its subsequent UN integration; and the continuous NATO country cooperation in Afghanistan, notably in the shape also of figthing elite units.

The actual big question about foreign policy doctrine is whether the Democrats can develop a trustworthy alternative to sniping and unthinking anti-globalisation. The challenge is the same in Europe, where populism on the left is decidedly on the rise. Squaring ideals with practice was never easy, but it is the politician's primary task to create visions which bridge counter-tendencies. Alas, the European politicians seem much less capable of this than the American academics. But will the American politicians listen to their academics?

Ghani Would Be Good For UN: FT Op-Ed On Reconstruction

Among the various candidatures either vented, expected or encouraged for the next UN Secretary General, the best looking is Ashraf Ghani, present Chancellor of Kabul University. My arguments for a Ghani candidature have been mentioned before (Next UNSG: Ghani and the Scandinavians plus Next UNSG Must Know Security) so the reason I bring him up here is his recent op/ed-piece in the Financial Times: "Afghanistan has the assets to regain momentum" (subscribers only, but sabawoon.com brings the whole text here):

There is an emerging consensus, domestic and international, that Afghanistan is likely to slide into chaos. This misses the central point: there are assets in place that, if organised coherently, could re-establish momentum towards creating a stable, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. If failure is not an option for the international community, attention must be focused on renewing Afghans’ trust in a bright future to make them active partners in the fight against violence and disorder. The problem has arisen from failure to adapt to a changed context, loss of momentum in pursuing a credible programme of development and mis-calibrated use of violence. (...)

What are the elements of a strategy? Hamid Karzai, president, and his government have a choice: act decisively and become founding fathers of a dignified nation or go down as those who squandered a golden chance. They must show commitment to rule of law and accountability. First, they must establish a supreme court that is a model of independence. Second, they must confront corruption through a commission of Afghan and international people who could investigate allegations at the highest levels and impose sanctions. Third, they must pursue good governance. Fourth, they must build equality of opportunity for the young generation. Fifth, security strategy must be overhauled.

Regional support must be renewed: in particular, Pakistan should be persuaded that stability in Afghanistan provides the basis of its own stability and prosperity. The imbalance between military and developmental expenditure by the international community needs to be redressed, with new mechanisms that would reinvigorate the Afghans’ energies for reconstructing their country. As the key to prosperity lies in regional trade and investment, the Gulf countries could play an important role. While use of force is going to be required, it must be placed within a comprehensive strategy of state-building. The anti-drugs strategy must be revisited to ensure it is aligned with the overall objective.

Ghani's expertise in state-building and reconstruction operations is clear as he recommends a wiser use of force (viz. the debate on the political nature of counterinsurgency where the centre of gravity is always the hearts and minds, as argued e.g. here); and a balancing of expenditures on military and civil means. Interestingly for his theoretical candidature, he smartly doesn't critize the US directly, but keeps to challenging the Karzai administration with pretty sound and concrete advice. Most importantly the piece shows his commitment not only to Afghanistan -- but also to the crucial combination of development and security embodied in the reconstruction task.

Understanding the challenge of the convergence of security and development will be essential for any coming UN Secretary General. Without knowledge of both development and security in practice (and, as Ghani has, also preferrably in theory) there is less of a chance that the UNSG will succeed. The next UNSG will have to deal with development as much as geopolitics -- and the other way around. Since most stakeholders seem to focus on either side of the coin diplomatic skills and a sense of urgency for either agenda, and their converging trend, is utterly important.

* * *

Later update on the concrete case: al-Zawahri calls for attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan ("Al-Qaeda Leader Calls for Afghan Rebellion", Washington Post); while Karzai echoes Ghani's critique of the present tactics ("Karzai Calls for Reassessing U.S. Strategy", from AP).

Somalia: A Long War Test Case

Somalia is a test case for the Pentagon-defined Long War against global terrorism: involvement by proxy in order to deter and defeat actual and potential terrorists; hence a campaign that looks set to be more political in nature than military. Basically, this kind of action would lend itself to a battleground between "CIA" and "State Department" operation types and operatives: one that the "CIA"-like organizations so far is dominating -- and losing.

The US supported "anti-terror" warlords have been dealt a blow in Mogadishu by other factions rallying around a sharia court system -- possibly one of the few working social "organizations" in Somalia that is not tinged by ethnic and clan allegiances.

And as opposed to the more directly greed-based warlord-system, it comes with an ethics of social interaction. At the face of things, it is logical for the US to have chosen a number of warlords to support the case against terrorist breeding grounds. But only apparently, when the setup is not conceived holistically; where all actors are not given some legitimacy. A logic of complete friend-foe distinction doesn't function when we are dealing with counter-insurgency-type goals. Moreover, and concomitantly, just because we choose to bet on some guys (chosen for pragmatic reasons), it doesn't mean that their victory will be ours -- or that the opposite is the case.

An interesting analysis Reuters analysis by C. Bryson Hull looks for the positive outcomes of the events:

Despite vows by the Islamist leaders to create a Muslim state, many diplomats said U.S. fears of Somalia becoming a terrorist base were overblown and that on the contrary, the new order may be a boost for peace. "In all likelihood, this may lead to some substantial progress in Somalia. It's quite an opening," a European diplomat involved in Somalia's peace process told Reuters on condition of anonymity. The only catch, the diplomat said, is that "most Western governments, when they hear sharia courts, think 'terrorists'."

The courts deny any al Qaeda links, although one senior Islamic court leader, Adan Hashi Ayro, was trained in Afghanistan and is suspected of involvement with the group. Security experts and diplomats say there are training camps in and around Mogadishu and that a handful of al Qaeda operatives are there. The Islamists were quick to try and calm fears they were harbouring al Qaeda by saying they shared "no objectives, goals or methods with groups that sponsor or support terrorism".

John Prendergast's column in the Washington Post: "Our Failure in Somalia" explains the dilemmas of making counter-insurgency by proxy in a country where there is no state -- and goes on to call for a more sustained state-building mission:

Now "our" warlords -- and by extension our counterterrorism strategy -- have been dealt a crushing defeat by the Islamists, as the latter have consolidated control of Mogadishu. Our short-term interest in locating al-Qaeda suspects has thus been undermined, and the risk of a new safe haven being created for international terrorists has been greatly increased. (...)

A successful counterterrorism effort would require the United States to pull the political and military threads together into a coherent strategy of broader engagement. U.S. officials and those from other governments throughout the region uniformly have told me that long-term counterterrorism objectives can be achieved only by American investment in the Somali peace process. Yet the State Department has just one full-time political officer working on Somalia -- from neighboring Kenya, and he was just transferred out of the region for dissenting from the policy on proxy warlords. Somalia's ineffectual transitional government remains confined to the shaky central town of Baidoa, where it is still struggling to overcome internal divisions.

A functioning government that could ensure security would be a win-win scenario for Somalis and the United States, enabling the state apparatus to address the criminality and extremism that undermine progress in the country. This would provide a real partner for the war on terrorism in an area that has a track record for exporting trouble. (...) The United States can no longer afford not to engage more deeply and directly in state reconstruction efforts in Somalia. It is in our national security interest to do so. (Emphasis added.)

Two points on Prendergast: 1) He peddles an unproven point on terror and failed states, 2) State Department must enter the fray: one guy doesn't cut it.

1) As I have stated before, it is a very open question whether the failed states of the world deserve our attention in the short term on the ground that they feed terrorists. The claim is very widespread, but I think it is not substantiated. What is substantiated though, is the interest we have in the long term in building secure and stable and democratic states, thus shrinking the World's zone of risk, and minimizing its bad spill-over to ourselves. In the middle term, alleviating the risk for local and regional spill-over is enormously important. Regional spill-over effects have been important drivers of many African conflicts, notably in West Africa and the conflicts in Congo (just to underpin the regional dynamics already in play, Kenya just rejected one newly emigrated warlord).

2) Running a foreign policy by proxy and through covert operations may have its advantages. But one advantage that is lost with that model is the added efficiency of a diverse public scrutiny and creatively productive debate. If Prendergast is correct about the one -- one! -- guy from State, then State really have to get their act together. The NSPD 44 and S/CRS should be enough for them to thump CIA and who else is in there, and at least claim a stake in the process. If that guy's withdrawal really was a result of diverging policy views then a) lets get the debate out in the open, b) those who remain (CIA and probably SOCOM) would be well advised not to fight a further US investment in Somalia, even if it means offering State a seat at the table.

Later update: nicely corresponding article in the Washington Post, "Guns Finally Silent in Somalia's Capital" -- plus AP's "Somali Islamic Leader Blasts US".

The Barnier Report: Slow Step Towards A European State-Building Agency

Western operational capacities -- military and civilian -- are slowly being transformed so they can cooperate under tough circumstances, thus enabling global administration of the weakest parts of the state system. The Barnier report (more below) could be one step in this direction if it is implemented by the EU and its member states.

In the US, visionary strategist Thomas P. M. Barnett famously advocated splitting Pentagon up in two parts: A Department of War (the "Leviathan Force") and a "Department of Everything Else", where the latter should deal with all of the politically difficult Military Operations Other Than War, i.e. the long-lasting statebuilding and stabilization missions that will be essential to win the Long War, and secure the rest of the world's entry to Barnett's Core of globalization of the next 50 to 100 years. So far, this does not look set to happen within the Pentagon: DoD Directive 3000 does put the essential MOOTW capabilities of Stabilization and Reconstruction at par with Major Combat Operations (and calls for them to be integrated at all force levels). But the NSPD 44 on the other hand gives State Department the final responsibility for all coming statebuilding operations, thus effectively alleviating the theoretical pressure on Pentagon for real reform (more here on both). State's Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) has the institutional baton, but few ressurces.

If the American policy system as such has moved forward on paper -- to some extent -- and with a top-down approach, the European Union has been busy for quite some time building capacities and moving foward on the area of civilian crisis management, including cooperation with military crises management structures. The EU will never replace NATO or become a military machine anywhere near the US in terms of major combat ops. But the civilian crises reponse area is closely connected to the general development and humanitarian policies of the (especially Northern) European countries and as such a area where the more pro-UN inclined European countries together might make a difference -- or at least inspire equivalent American progress.

J-M Barroso, President of the European Commisssion, has asked Michel Barnier (former Trade Commissioner, French Foreign Minister, and head of the French Amsterdam-treaty negotiation team) for a report on possible recommendations on a related subject: "For a European civil protection force: Europe Aid" was published early May. The report makes 12 recommendations for a strengthening of the European, civilian crisis management capacities. The most interesting of these is the creation of a common, uniformed but civilian protection force suited to act in a on a number of different scenarios, ranging from natural to man-made distasters (including terrorism) and both inside and outside of the EU.

This "force" has the potential to become the European version of the Department of Everything Else. Two possible arguments would go against that claim: 1) "Europe Aid" is purely civilian and have no guns or military capacities, 2) the envisioned scenarios do not explicitly include warlike conditions outside of Europe or long-term statebuilding and reconstruction proper, but is more couched in terms of protecting European citizens abroad (as a follow up on the tsunami-disaster). Ad 1): The intense work in progress on enhanced civil-military cooperation (or CIMIC) in both EU and NATO context will over time alleviate this problem. All NATO military actors involved in COIN and SR around the globe must by now have seen the necessity of a very enhanced CIMIC function.

Ad 2): If we rank the different scenarios or mission types in terms of increasing care for other people, rather than just protecting our own citizens, this ranking correlates completely with one going from disaster reponse over more broadly conceived humanitarian operations to complex emergencies, the most difficult of which are the statebuilding and reconstruction operations. Building a "European civil protection force" with even just a small long-range transport capacity for deployment outside of the EU is a logical first step; the resulting units will suddenly look very, very useful whenever the next stabilization crises comes along (or directly be called for to be sent to Afghanistan where NATO is in the middle of an important and extremely dangerous buildup).

The Barnier report thus builds on the recommendations of the Barcelona-report by Mary Kaldor and others in a useful, piecemeal way. Among the concrete recommendations is the founding of a common Operations Centre (with mostly coordinating functions) and a common/joint Training centre:

A Training Institute for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid would be set up. Its location would be chosen by the Council. It would provide training for staff and for the national and regional teams making up the European force and for the evaluation experts working for the EU. It would train the single reconnaissance teams (proposal 5). The Institute would also be open to NGOs, and on certain conditions to volunteers from among the public who possessed expertise that would be useful in assistance and rescue operations.

It follows from this proposal that given that Denmark has...

* extensive institutional experience with joint training through the SHIRBRIG-brigade
* huge operational CIMIC experience in the field with the ongoing operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere
* a concrete programme for cooperation and joint development of standards between the MFA and MoD (which, even if much less ambitious than it should be, at least has prepared the two ministries to cooperate)
* an accellerating programme for domestic civilian distaster response coordination and standardization which is located under the MoD
* a high level of belief and investment in the UN humanitarian operations (OCHA), including through funding to local but globally deployed NGOs

...Denmark should work hard to get to host this Training Institute. By definition the training is civilian; but some of the knowhow is military and the Danish institutional experience and setup makes it ideally suited to produce the civilian training, and at the same time prepare for further enhanced CIMIC ops. Furthermore, the Danish derogation on defense makes it impossible for Denmark to participate in EU military ops: supporting and running the civilian training centre would make it possible for Denmark to still play a substantial role in EUs security related activities. Over time, the derogation is expected to go, and so the centre could naturally take on further, more directly CIMIC related activities. Moreover, the Institute would fit with Denmark's active foreign policy profile in terms of both development and security politics as it does with the Danish state's generally ambitious responsibilities towards its own citizens at home as abroad. Finally, strengthening the EU capacity in this area is wholly in accordance with the Danish foreign policy in strengthened and reformed UN related capacities (the report calls for the force exhibit a dual subsidiarity, to member states and to the UN). Getting to host the Training Institute if it becomes reality would thus make sense on all levels for Denmark.

The Long War, Casualty Adversity and Fortified Concrete

Secretary of State Rice's launch of a plan for change at State named "transformational diplomacy" nominally mirrors the "transformation" at the Pentagon. But more substantially, it also lays the ground for the State Department part of the civilian work to be done in the Long War. The focus on moving diplomats away from the safer zones of the world toward the turmoil -- from the Core to the Gap, in the words of Thomas P. M. Barnett -- is a logical equivalent of the global counterinsurgency campaign that is the Long War.

As all true counterinsurgency, this campaign will necessarily be fought though politics, with political means for political ends (more on this e.g. here). In this, legitimacy is always the overriding goal, and this is where the transformational diplomacy's promise of moving more people into the field -- out of the capitals and into the regions -- looks both promising and necessary. From former US AID Director Andrew Natsios' article "American Fortresses" at the Weekly Standard website:

This new diplomacy--the work of a generation, Rice said--requires, among other things, redeploying many U.S. diplomats from Europe and Washington to countries like China, India, Nigeria, and Lebanon, given that the threat to the nation's vital interests has moved from the European theater to the Third World, the preferred haven for many of the extra-state forces threatening the United States. It will involve sending single officers out of embassies to small, low-key regional offices called American Presence Posts to interact regularly with civil society, something tried with considerable success in Indonesia and Egypt by Powell's State Department. A greater emphasis will be placed on regional approaches to public diplomacy, and on rapid response teams like those AID already uses for disaster relief. Our best foreign-language speakers will be "forward deployed" and encouraged to appear on live TV in their host countries. The Internet will be put to imaginative use to engage previously unreached audiences. The changes and the fresh thinking come not a moment too soon.

Still unknown is how fiercely the bureaucratic systems of the State Department will resist this shift, and whether the perverse security dynamic in our embassies can be reversed. What is certain is that a zero-risk mentality is not a war-winning mentality. Unless we allow for a tolerable level of managed risk--even risk to life and limb--neither our diplomats nor our aid missions can do the work for which they exist, at a time when their contribution is more needed than ever.

But exactly the nexus of the Pentagon's Long War against terrorism and State's means for Development (which then becomes a crucial tool of Security) is problematic. Natsios have some very good observations concerning the practical challenges related to implementing these strategies: in effect, casualty adversity due to political sensitivity and true threats are blocking these changes in practice.

The 1998 bombings, the Crowe report, and the attacks on 9/11 gradually increased the authority of the State Department's regional security officers by changing the incentive structure within embassies around security issues. The State Department's Diplomatic Security Service--the second largest bureau, with 34,000 employees including foreign hires--grew as the threat increased. Concerned that they might be blamed for failing to anticipate other incidents, regional security officers became increasingly cautious about allowing official Americans to move around freely outside embassies, and they tightened procedures for outsiders seeking to enter. Ambassadors themselves grew less and less willing to overrule their security officers out of concern that if an incident occurred they would be held responsible. The divisive politics of the Beltway, where security incidents become instant fodder for editorials, congressional hearings, campaign ads, and political recriminations, accelerated this perverse dynamic. (...)

Midlevel diplomats and aid officers who were supposed to spend their days interacting with the societies in which they served were more handicapped by the new security measures than ambassadors and AID mission directors, who usually had security details at their command. For aid officers who previously had done much of their work in the countryside, this meant fewer and fewer opportunities to build the relationships with local leaders and communities that underpin development work and ensure that U.S.-funded projects respond to local needs. It meant less chance to see firsthand what was happening in out-of-the-way regions, and to adapt programs to changing local realities. (...)

The situation is most extreme in Iraq, where official Americans are permitted to travel outside their working compounds--even inside the Green Zone--only if the trips are planned three days in advance, and then only with a security detail usually composed of a large contingent of retired commandos from Western militaries hired at great cost from private security contractors. Inevitably, the number of Americans leaving the compounds has dropped. Partner organizations, both Iraqi and American-based, began asking AID staff not to visit them in their offices outside the Green Zone because the large security details were drawing the attention of the insurgents. At the same time, the number of Iraqis and partner organizations visiting USAID officers in their compound, never very high, also dropped month after month. The high walls, the barbed wire, the heavy weapons at each corner, the high casualty rates of Iraqis waiting at checkpoints to get into the Green Zone, and the onerous screening procedures were an obvious discouragement. Afghanistan is little better.

This has hampered the reconstruction process in both countries ever so subtly. Reconstruction and development are not principally about building physical structures, but about building institutions, reforming policies, and transferring values and technology. To do it successfully, USAID officers must interact regularly with officials in government ministries, with professors in their universities, members of professional associations, leaders of businesses and religious institutions, and with local NGOs. At its core, it is about building trust and shared commitments.

It is daily interactions with local people and the personal trust they lead to that allow aid officers to guide change and encourage reform-minded officials. These relationships are often more important than any program. In Iraq and Afghanistan, these interactions are now limited to telephone calls and emails... (emphasis added).

When transformational diplomacy meets the security issues of the operational reality we are back at the fundamental challenge of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (counterinsurgency proper): there can be no reconstruction with security, but security itself can get in the way of reconstruction. The intervening variable here is casualty adversity: basically many of these operations and missions cannot be undertaken without running greater risks, meeting the locals without armor.

But the political sensitivity surrounding the issue is pretty fundamental: the original "contract" about humanitarian interventions between the populations and governments of the West rested on 1) the use of precision guided weapons, and the feasibility of "surgical" operations, thus minimizing civilian casualties, and 2) (and more importantly) on low losses among our own people, be they military or civilian. The trouble is that this contract cannot hold in the widened, more ambitious agenda -- be it framed as the Long War, or UN-sponsored humanitarian intervention.

The straightforward solution? Intensive and massive training capabilities directed at the local population whose casualty adversity is necessarily lower. In any case, we need to develop a common paradigm for civilian peacebuilding and military counterinsurgency and S&R operations.

Schwarz Obituary on Jean-François Revel: No Aron

Stephen Schwarz' obit on Jean-François Revel in the Weekly Standard is an interesting read: Revel's career and ideological trajectory was a meeting point for many of the tensions of the cold war. One element is the drift of some responsable thinkers from leftism to the pro-Western stance of either conservatism (the US) or liberalism (Europe) -- as mentioned here in this post on New Republic editor Beinart's dissection of historical roots of the Democratic foreign policy challenge. Another is the functional role of the liberal/conservative French intellectuals out of necessity but not choice: as pundits, newspaper people and sometimes politicians (Pierre Lellouche) -- but not academics with the notable exception of Raymond Aron, who was nonetheless both crowned and isolated as a member of the Collège de France. Finally, there is the transatlantic orientation of those on the European side, always a little bit gauche, even if to the right, in their domestic public domains, and even if they had access to the powers that be.

Good piece, but a bit weird that Schwarz doesn't mention the towering figure of Raymond Aron, whose Opium of the Intellectuals is still the best analysis of the function and fascination of Marxism as a secular religion: of stupidity and temerity in the face of progress. Aron's trajectory was more or less the same as Revel's: he just wrote better books, had more influence, and did it all long before Revel.

Defending Idealism: Beinart, Niebuhr and the Republicans

On the balance, the biggest challenge to global politics in the medium term is the battle over the relative dominance of what International Relations people call "realism" and "idealism". The former is on the rise -- as a reaction to the perceived overly naive neoconservative approach to global affairs. Almost all of the most prominent IR academics signed a letter calling for more "realism" in the run up to the Iraq war; and as written here, there is a strong urge within the strategy and defense environment to revert to safer defensive ways. The ghost of realism is isolationism: exactly what is not needed when globalization is at stake.

This battle of ideas -- ideologies and inclinations leading to policy -- is dissectable on several different levels, but not predictably so. The neonservative idealism is one such surprise; the American Democrats tentative love affair with realism another. The New York Times Magazine ran an amazing article on the subject, pitting two versions of American self-understanding against each other in an attempt to reconstruct the long lost Democrat responsible standing on foreign and security policies.

The Democrat challenge is almost completely the same for the European left. Ever since the end of the Cold War, the European left has been wandering in a vaccum of ideas. The Socialdemocratic parties look at globalization, humanitarian interventionism, the protection and spread of freedom with extreme ambivalence, and all of them have failed to produce a proactive or even positive agenda. Failing that they have been left to always react, always second-guessing and always correcting more than proposing a course.

New Republic editor Peter Beinart's article is the best description so far of a solution to the Democrat challenge (maybe tied with the pieces written by Matt Bai in the same publication about the Republican and Democrat electoral machines; his forthcoming book will also be very interesting). A few nuggets from "The Rehabilitation of the Cold-War Liberal" which is reworked from his coming book The Good Fight: Why Liberals — and Only Liberals — Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again:

Democrats have no shortage of talented foreign-policy practitioners. Indeed, they have no shortage of worthwhile foreign-policy proposals. Even so, they cannot tell a coherent story about the post-9/11 world. And they cannot do so, in large part, because they have not found their usable past. (...)

But before Vietnam, and the disappointment and confusion it spawned, liberals did have a clear story of their own. In the late 1940's and 1950's, intellectuals like Reinhold Niebuhr and policymakers like George F. Kennan described America's cold-war struggle differently from their conservative counterparts: as a struggle not merely for democracy but for economic opportunity as well, in the belief that the former required the latter to survive. Even more important, they described America itself differently. Americans may fight evil, they argued, but that does not make us inherently good. And paradoxically, that very recognition makes national greatness possible. Knowing that we, too, can be corrupted by power, we seek the constraints that empires refuse. And knowing that democracy is something we pursue rather than something we embody, we advance it not merely by exhorting others but by battling the evil in ourselves. The irony of American exceptionalism is that by acknowledging our common fallibility, we inspire the world. (...)

George Kennan, architect of the Truman administration's early policies toward the Soviet Union, called Niebuhr the "father of us all." And in the first years of the cold war, Niebuhr's emphasis on moral fallibility underlay America's remarkable willingness to restrain its power. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States represented half of the world's G.D.P., and the nations of Western Europe lay militarily and economically prostrate. Yet the Truman administration self-consciously bound America within institutions like NATO, which gave those weaker nations influence over American conduct. "We all have to recognize, no matter how great our strength," Truman declared, "that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please." As the historian John Lewis Gaddis has written: "It was not that the Americans lacked the capacity to force their allies into line.. . .What is surprising is how rarely this happened; how much effort the United States put into persuading — quite often even deferring to — its NATO partners."

Kennan believed America's great advantage in the cold war was that the Soviet Union constituted an empire, which held its alliances together by force. By contrast, he argued, if the United States resisted the imperial temptation and built alliances that respected foreign nationalism, those alliances would endure.

Getting Democrats to embrace a certain form of idealism is highly important in strategic, electionesque terms for them -- but, leaving the left-right question out here, even more so for global politics in general. Yet the Democrat rebirth is perhaps less iof a problem for the overall struggle between idealism and realism than the coming legacy of neoconservatism -- and with it, idealism -- within Republican circles. Authoritarianism and non-interventionism is on the rise in the global environment, especially through China and Russia (as argued here and here). Preserving the good governance element in the Long War, and thus counterinsurgency proper, is highly important even if it means proxy "wars" with China over influence in Africa and other developing regions -- actually the whole of Thomas P.M. Barnett's Non-Integrating Gap.

But this cannot happen unless the Republicans do not revert to pure realism and a penchant for blunt use of force. Getting the Republicans to see and embrace the collaborative OECD-ification of the Gap is more crucial even than securing a Democrat reversal to it. John McCain still looks the best bet on this account.

And the European left? They would do well to substitute USA for the "West" in Beinart's article and take a positive stance on progressiveness -- maybe even learn a lesson from the self-assured Republican agenda: the European left's greatest challenge is the surplus of self-doubt. A bit of self-doubt is fine: legions are devastating.

Counterinsurgency: Changing the Military Ethos

The complete reversal of the Foreign Affairs article outlining the Bush Administration's foreign policy priorities -- from big power politics to weak state stability -- continues. The Quadrennial Defense Review and other central policy documents have over the last 6 months been published with the Long War against terrorism as a central tenet. The craft of the American soldier changes in function of this re-organization for the Long War: from army vs army battles to counterinsurgency as nationbuilding.

The American defense etablishment may be huge and not prone to change, but the Pentagon seems to have been surprisingly nifty on this account. Or rather: those who have propagated this change seem to have had a fair amount of influence within the Army (as the QDR showed, there seems to be no support for or plans about major realignments of budget, meaning that the well-intended reforms for preparing for and executing the Long War proposed with the QDR are not funded on any meaningful level when compared with e.g. the missile defense bills). Thomas P. M. Barnett who more or less predicted all of this change ought to wake up feeling good about himself every day.

The change from army battles to effects based COIN is a huge and very difficult step for any military organization. The lesser NATO members have to some extent already been through this reorganization during the 1990s when their Departments of Defense were looking for a functional raison d'etre (in terms of both funding and strategy). But the challenge is bigger for the US Army exactly because of its prowess in the military arts: the ingrained self-understanding of the soldier (legitimate and non-reflexive use of power; friend vs. foe dichotomies; imposition of strategic will on opponent) must necessarily clash with a political conceptualization of counterinsurgency, which demands a much more holistic or contextual understanding of the processes related to the "enemy" -- because here "victory" equals not his "defeat" but his succesful integration into a democratic, non-violent political process (minus those who cannot accept the new setup).

This change is nothing less than a de- and reconstruction of the military ethos -- at strategic and tactical levels: the politics of the mission is everywhere; everything is communication of intent -- and so collateral damage becomes heavily fined. Interestingly, the US military's realignment to politically sensitive counterinsurgency is functionally akin to the civilian humanitarian agenda's call for the use of the military instrument sparingly and surgically. Actually, the "contract" between governments and people in the Western, pro-UN circuit of countries about the use of force as an element in humanitarianism relies on this precision of means and similiarity of goals (basically fusion) with development policy.

The New York Times has a fine piece about this whole reorganization in practice: "Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for Battle", which of course is neither straightforward to train and learn, nor easily implemented in practice beacuse of the (here: domestic) strategic context:

The troops who come here are at the heart of a vast shift in American war-fighting strategy, a multibillion-dollar effort to remodel the Army on the fly. Here, the Army is relearning how to fight, shifting from its historic emphasis on big army-to-army battles to the more subtle tactics of defeating a guerrilla insurgency. The changes in the Army's emphasis are among the most far-reaching since World War II, all being carried out at top speed, while the Iraqi insurgency continues undiminished and political support for the war ebbs at home. American commanders say publicly that they still believe they can win the war, especially now with a more coherent strategy to combat the insurgency and train their soldiers to fight it. (...)

For the first time in more than 20 years, military planners are revising the Army's counterinsurgency manual, adding emphasis on nation-building and peacekeeping — subjects once belittled by the Bush administration. At the Army's Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kan., officers are being required for the first time to complete a course in counterinsurgency. (...) Junior officers are being encouraged to take greater initiative to adjust to local circumstances. An old military tradition of chronicling the lessons learned on the front and passing them on to other units has found a vital new outlet in password-protected Internet sites where platoon commanders and more senior officers can exchange combat experiences. (...) One third of the American troops now stationed in Iraq have been through the course here, and entire brigades — each with 4,000 soldiers, sometimes more — are processed through here every month. But it is still unclear how much effect the new training is having in the field.

Indeed, even as the new training strategy moves forward, American units are substantially withdrawing from Iraq's streets. With the country sliding closer to civil war, Iraqi military units, many of them of uncertain quality, are now taking the leading combat role in nearly half of Iraq's territory. (...) "There is a paradox in the approach," said Kalev Sepp, a former Special Forces officer and one of the most vocal proponents for changing the Army. "The training in the United States and in Iraq is teaching all the right things — decentralization of authority and responsibility to the lowest levels, engagement with the Iraqi population, cultural awareness and political sensitivity — the full broad range of measures needed to defeat the insurgency." "But on the ground," Mr. Sepp said in an interview, "the troops are being moved onto these large consolidated bases and being drawn away from the population just at point that they have been trained to engage them."

UPDATE: Washington Post has an interesting article on the situation in Iraq - quoting some of the stabilization & reconstruction savviest people, including Dobbins, Hammes and Wilson III: "Merits of Partitioning Iraq or Allowing Civil War Weighed".

Later UPDATE: On the ground in Afghanistan the US Army knows how to counterinsurgency; see this WashPost article: "US Commander in Afghanistan Thinks Locally".

The Waning Momentum of Freedom

The disheartening discrepancy between the potential importance of the discipline of International Relations and the actual low relative dominance in output of analytical ideas of its main producers is again underscored by one of its brightest outsiders, Robert D. Kaplan (any shortlist of the most influental pieces of IR literature in the 1990s cannot but include three titles by non-IR-scholars: Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy, Fukuyama's End of History and Huntington's Clash of Civilization?).

As with his last Washington Post piece this new one is brillant in both academic and real terms: do go read "Old States, New Threats". The last piece was a call for more emphasis on stability and less on "democracy": as stated in this post there are several caveats to bear in mind before embracing his analysis. This new one basically takes its outset in the logic of states' lowered cost of entering the international security politics market because of the falling relative price of devastating disruptive and other coercive technologies and practices:

Borders may be eroding and stateless terrorist groups like al-Qaeda proliferating, but don't be fooled: The traditional state remains the most dangerous force on the international scene. Perhaps the greatest security threat we face today is from a paranoid and resentful state leader, armed with biological or nuclear weapons and willing to make strategic use of stateless terrorists. These old-fashioned bad guys often have uncertain popular support, but that does not make them easy to dislodge. We don't live in a democratic world so much as in a world in the throes of a very messy democratic transition, so national elections combined with weak, easily politicized institutions produce a lethal mix -- dictators armed with pseudo-democratic legitimacy. (...)

Globalization is a cultural and economic phenomenon -- not a system of international security. Indeed, the notion that a state's sovereignty carries less weight these days because the international community will not tolerate grave human rights abuses seems relevant only in the case of poor, marginal states like Liberia, Somalia and Haiti, where no great power has an overriding interest in maintaining the regimes. Nevertheless, just look at how hard it has been to get Sudan's president, Omar Hassan Bashir, to cooperate in alleviating the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.

Meanwhile, the tyrants from big states continue to use the global media as an equalizing weapon against the United States and the rest of the West. They may also use what Yale political science professor Paul Bracken calls "disruptive technologies," referring to nuclear and biological weapons -- the secrets of which cannot ultimately be protected. A host of new powers, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, can, by concentrating on such technologies, render our tanks, bombers and fighter jets impotent. Our military edge against these traditional bad guys is slipping even as our military gets better because our relative power in the world depends on a status quo that cannot be maintained.

We are entering a well-armed world, with more players than ever who can unhinge the international system and who have fewer reasons to be afraid of us. That's why a resentful state leader, armed with disruptive technologies and ready to make use of stateless terrorists, poses such a threat.

What would Kaplan's two latest pieces mean in combination? A less pro-democratic agenda coupled with a more cynical realist preference for stability; multilateral means for the former and old-school bilateral stick and carrots for the security related crisis situations, perhaps ... which sounds ominously like a Cold War paradigm where less change is in the cards. That may not be a bad thing if it contributes to uphold the economic integration process known as globalization which serves both to feed the world and potentially to be a building block for the spread of freedom in the long run (even if it does result in postponing the cashing in).

But it would mean, on the other hand, that the special moment -- one of plasticity and remoulding of base lines in world politics -- identified by Condoleeza Rice as akin to the 1947 situation, is gone. That analysis is supported by another bright guy, Sebastian Mallaby's piece on multilateralism's new weakness: "Why Globalization Has Stalled".

Fifteen years ago, there were hopes that the end of Cold War splits would allow international institutions to acquire a new cohesion. But the great powers of today are simply not interested in creating a resilient multilateral system. Europe is distracted by its economic malaise and by the challenge of building its own union. Japan has yet to translate its economic clout into political or military power. China's dictators care about keeping the lid on simmering unrest, not about helping to resolve global financial imbalances or Iran's nuclear crisis. India has huge potential as a Democratic superpower, but has only just begun to realize it. The United States remains the only plausible quarterback for the multilateral system. But the Bush administration has alienated too many players to lead the team effectively. Its strident foreign policy started out as an understandable response to the fecklessness of other powers. But unilateralism has tragically backfired, destroying whatever slim chance there might have been of a workable multilateral alternative.

The momentum sensed a few years ago does seem to be waning. Whereas the rest of the OECD has in practice been bandwagoning around the American world order, China and other countries like Chavez' Venezuela point to a future of renewed indirect confrontations over what a reasonable state should look like. The balancing struggle looks increasing like a Cold War setup except for the fact that the opposing camp has as its only common agenda the opposition to a too American-looking globalization of not so much economics but of democratic politics.

And with the major players on the Western side wavering in their commitment and failing ability to promote the latter agenda, realpolitik is definitely on the rise -- as exemplifed in the American policies on the autocracies in the former Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan and Kazahkstan (see Jackson Diehl's piece on "Retreat from the Freedom Agenda"). That is a pity.

Later UPDATE: Robert Kagan's monthly piece in the Washington Post -- "League of Dictators?" -- touches on the same subject as this post and the one below on China. Interesting as always.

China's African Policy: Proxy Wars over Good Governance

Is China derailing the West's African development policies? Will the East-West proxy wars of yesteryear be repeated in the economic realm -- with negative consequences for the largely Western sponsored intention to diminish the reach of kleptocratic dictatorships? Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation has an interesting piece, "Back to the Maoist Future", on these questions in the Weekly Standard:

Across the planet, China is aggressively seeking new friends and allies, and proving to be a less-demanding alternative to the more scrupulous United States and European nations. Africa's traditional European colonial and American partners now find their vision of a continent governed by free-market democracies and the rule of law challenged by Beijing's scramble for influence and resources. Nothing is driving China into Africa more than its insatiable appetite for oil and gas. For the past decade, the Chinese economy has expanded annually at near double-digit rates, requiring an enormous influx of resources. China is already the world's second largest energy consumer, leading Beijing to Africa's door in an effort to reduce its reliance on volatile Middle Eastern sources. Today, Africa provides China with 30 percent of its energy imports. (...)

China is rapidly expanding its influence in Africa to secure natural resources, expand Beijing's influence, and even isolate Taiwan through generous but self-serving diplomatic, financial, and military assistance. Chinese policies are endangering U.S. goals by supporting African dictatorships, hindering economic development, and exacerbating conflicts and human rights abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. What is needed is a comprehensive U.S. strategy that encourages democratic principles, human rights, free markets, and cooperation in regional security and energy development in concert with like-minded partners, looking beyond traditional European friends to democratic Asian and Latin American nations for support. Otherwise, China's broad energy, trade, political, diplomatic, and, yes, military interests threaten to undermine long-standing efforts to promote peace, prosperity, and democracy in Africa.

Brookes, of course, makes his analysis from the slightly broing perspective of the instinctual (Pentagon) China basher. Strategist Thomas P. M. Barnett's positive vision of a future with China provides a far more interesting and proactive framework for analysis. Nevertheless, in the case of Africa, it is interesting to see how the Chinese intend to behave and how that clashes with the immediate expression of our political goals (the latter foggy expression just to make a distinction between present policies and later, different policies which may well both be results of the same political aspirations).

China's recent African Policy document outlines an extensive interest in engaging in African development. The most notable difference from Western development policies is the absence of good governance as a leitmotiv -- and its logical counterpart, the adherence to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". The Principles support non-interference: as such they are at odds with the essence of Western development policy which posits that there can be universally applicable most-effective ways of undertaking government, i.e. "good governance".

China's African Policy identifies the African Union NEPAD-strategy as "[drawing] up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development." The most interesting mechanism in the NEPAD is probably the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which intends to create an African driven initiative to strengthen and encourage good governance in a cooperative way.

The problem is of course here, that reforms are seldom, if ever, implemented wholeheartedly without incentives, whether positive or negative. And since "Africa Works" already in the sense that the leading power structures do benefit from the present situations such incentives will most likely have to be external to the given country. If external incentives are to be continued with the help or at least non-obstruction of China, it will be necessary to find a way to work around the Chinese adherence to the Five Principles and thus non-interference.

The APRM could represent one model for doing so. A primary objective of any kind of externally supported wish for policy and institutional changes must always be to coopt the local leadership, which is what the APRM would be doing given that it comes to function. Furthermore, because the ARPM is African driven, it has a potential legitimacy with the Chinese given that it is not perceived to be what the West hopes it to be: a trojan horse. Yet, evidently, the most likely outcome is that a) the cooperative nature of the APRM will itself make it ineffective for any but maybe a few medium-crisis-beset countries, and b) China itself will attempt to coopt or obstruct the APRM. But still there might be an opportunity here. As Brookes notes, the Chinese engagement has a number of drawbacks:

While some Africans see the Chinese as kindred spirits who understand Africa's development plight and welcome the Chinese infrastructure projects, the PRC presence is also a source of consternation. Chinese firms underbid local companies, and PRC contractors often use cheap, imported Chinese labor, adding little to local employment or skill development. Moreover, cheap Chinese goods flood African markets, especially textiles, shuttering factories across the continent. And concessionary PRC loans have put International Monetary Fund and other bank projects on hold because of concerns about economic mismanagement and corruption.

Basically, what is needed is fact based examination of the broader economic effects of the Chinese African engament. This should be joined with an effort to make clear the cost of the trade off of preferring to deal with the Chinese over the Western policies. The latter will surely be more demanding up front and more beneficial in the long run.

Unfortunately the setup allows a Tito-like playing on both sides. As such it has the potential to create even more of the kind of double tongued lipservice, which corrupt leaders on the continent have for a long time mastered with regard to development aid. Moreover, the most crucial countries are the natural ressource rich kleptocracies that from the outset will be least inclined to ever participate in good governance initiatives. Here, the intention of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative already suffers from combination of the Chinese need for oil and the willfully blind perspective of the Five Principles.

In short, the good governance agenda looks set to really suffer from China's African engagement. And unfortunately, that effect will be the same elsewhere too.

Later UPDATE: Robert Kagan's monthly piece in the Washington Post -- "League of Dictators?" -- touches on the same subject as this post and the one above. Interesting as always.