The Politics of Assessing and Strategizing Iraq

Go Big, Go Home, Go Long. Thus were the options scrutinized in JCS Pace's study back in November last year. The first was the logical military solution, the second the somewhat (now: really) pressing political solution, and the third, a little unclearly, represented something between a smart version of the first (through the lens of the COIN manual) and a compromise between the two first - each expressing the needs on the ground in Iraq and the needs on the ground in the domestic US situation.

Back last year I wrote:

The Long War is marked by its accelleration of the politicization of the use of force: the fronts are simultaneously on the ground and at home. Operations happen within two realms: effects are created almost at the same time in the immediate/practical and in the symbolical/communicative realms.

Modern war, it seems, better get it right fast enough that the domestic situation doesn't catch up with it, and start redefining. Not unjust that - merely a democratic precondition for the use of force.

From NYT: Some Hitherto Staunch G.O.P. Voters Souring on Iraq
From The AP (via the Age, Australia): Military leaders doubtful about success in Iraq
From WashTimes (Harlan Ullman): Assessing the Iraq surge
From the LAT: Iraq likely to miss goals set by U.S.